Korean J Prev Med.
2000 Dec;33(4):393-401.
Impacts of DRG Payment System on Behavior of Medical Insurance Claimants
- Affiliations
-
- 1Department of Health Policy and Management, Seoul National University College of
Medicine.
- 2Korea Health Industry Department Institute.
- 3Department of Preventive Medicine, College of Medicine, Korea University.
Abstract
OBJECTIVES
To evaluate the impacts of the DRG payment system on the behavior of
medical insurance claimants. Specifically, we evaluated the case-mix index, the numbers
of diagnosis and procedure codes utilized, and the corresponding rate of diagnosis codes
before, during and after implementation of the DRG payment system.
METHODS
In order to evaluate the case-mix index, the number of diagnosis and
procedure codes utilized, we used medical insurance claim data from all medical facilities
that participated in the DRG-based Prospective Payment Demonstration Program. This
medical insurance claim data consisted of both pre-demonstration program data
(fee-for-service, from November, 1998 to January, 1999) and post-demonstration program
data (DRG-based Prospective Payment, from February, 1999 to April, 1999). And in
order to evaluate the corresponding rate of diagnosis codes utilized, we reviewed 820
medical records from 20 medical institutes that were selected by random sampling
methods
.
RESULTS
The case-mix index rate decreased after the DRG-based Prospective Payment
Demonstration Program was introduced. The average numbers of different claim
diagnosis codes used decreased (new DRGs from 2.22 to 1.24, and previous DRGs from
1.69 to 1.21), as did the average number of claim procedure codes used (new DRGs
from 3.02 to 2.16, and previous DRGs from 2.97 to 2.43). With respect to the time of
participation in the program, the change in number of claim procedure codes was
significant, but the change in number of claim diagnosis codes was not. The
corresponding rate of claim diagnosis codes increased (from 57.9% to 82.6%), as did the
exclusion rate of claim diagnosis codes (from 16.5% to 25.1%).
CONCLUSIONS
After the implementation of the DRG payment system, the corresponding
rate of insurance claim codes and the corresponding exclusion rate of claim diagnosis
codes both increased, because the inducement system for entering the codes for claim
review was changed.